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June 2024
The United States Supreme Court on June 28 released its opinion in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, and Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, overturning the Chevron doctrine that compelled federal courts to defer to a federal agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Six justices joined in the majority opinion of the court; two justices joined the majority opinion while also filing separate concurring opinions, and two justices dissented with another justice (Justice Jackson) joining the dissent as it applies to Relentless (Justice Jackson did not take part in considering or deciding the Loper Bright Enterprises case).
The court held the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.
The majority opinion emphasized that its holding does "not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework. The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful--including the Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself--are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology.”
The majority opinion notes that careful attention to the judgment of the Executive Branch may help inform whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority and when a particular statute delegates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional limits, courts must respect the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts within it.
The Chevron doctrine played a critical role in the relationship between administrative agencies and the courts. Virtually all federal agencies that engage in rulemaking may be impacted by the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the Chevron doctrine. This is particularly relevant in tax, where taxpayers are challenging a number of recent regulations in the courts, including regulations under sections 78, 245A, 951A and 965. The Supreme Court’s opinion may impact the outcome of those controversies.
PwC will provide a detailed insight into the court’s decision in the coming days.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (No. 21-5166)), a case from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and to Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce (No. 21-1886), a case from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Both cases challenge the Chevron doctrine that compelled federal courts, in reviewing a federal government agency's action, to defer to the agency’s construction of a statute that Congress directed the agency to administer.
The Chevron doctrine, established in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), required courts to first determine whether the statute is ambiguous, and, if so, to defer to the federal government agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute.
The Loper Bright and Relentless cases challenged the regulations of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), which impose a per diem fee on vessels to pay for the observers that monitor compliance with fisheries rules. The statute at issue allows the government to require fishing boats to carry monitors but does not address who must pay for the monitors. The Loper Bright and Relentless cases were consolidated, as each case raises the question of whether the Chevron doctrine should apply. The Circuit Courts disagreed on whether the relevant statute grants the NMFS the power to force domestic vessels to pay the salaries of the monitors they must carry. The Supreme Court was asked to consider overruling the Chevron doctrine or clarifying that statutory silence on controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not create an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett, overrules the Chevron doctrine, holding that the APA requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch each wrote separate concurring opinions (in addition to joining the majority opinion). Justice Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Sotomayor and by Justice Jackson as it applies to Relentless (as noted above, Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of Loper Bright Enterprises).
In reaching its holding, the majority opined that “Chevron defies the command of the APA that the reviewing court—not the agency whose action it reviews—is to decide all relevant questions of law and interpret statutory provisions.” The majority also asserted that Chevron “requires a court to ignore, not follow, the reading the court would have reached had it exercised its independent judgment as required by the APA.”
The majority opinion based its holding on the following assertions: